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ABSTRACT
Rayan Joneydi: Choosing a Contraceptive Provider:
Access, Awareness and Fertility Decisions in Urban Senegal
(Under the direction of David K. Guilkey and Clement J. E. Joubert)
Contraceptive use is low in most parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, contributing to high fertility rates and
sustained population growth in this region. As a result, there is growing emphasis on promoting family
planning and improving access to contraceptives through various measures. I incorporate the most common
types of interventions—implementing an awareness campaign, reducing contraceptive prices, and increasing
the quantity and quality of providers—into a dynamic fertility model to compare the effectiveness of these
interventions. The model includes the decisions of married women to be sexually active, to use birth control
and to select a contraceptive provider among all the providers located within a given distance of their
dwelling place. I estimate the model on a rich data set that includes all the contraceptive providers in three
cities of Senegal, linked to a longitudinal sample of women. Simulations indicate that price reductions and
quality improvements could increase contraceptive use in urban Senegal. However, travel costs and cultural
barriers, including the fear of contraceptives and personal opposition, are greater obstacles towards using
contraceptives. I find that contraceptive use increased significantly between 2011 and 2015 in the three cities,
driven by a large-scale awareness campaign that addressed the benefits of family planning, its acceptance by
religious leaders, and widespread misconceptions about the harmfulness of contraceptives.
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SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
Fertility rates remain high in Sub-Saharan Africa, with an average of five children per women (twice
the world average) and a population growth rate of 2.74% in 2016.1 High fertility rates are associated with
a number of adverse effects in this region, including elevated risks of maternal and infant mortality, land
degradation and food insecurity (World Health Organization 2005, Cleland et al. 2006). As a result, family
planning is rising in the list of development priorities in Sub-Saharan Africa and is a growing recipient of
donor funds (Starbird, Norton and Marcus 2016).
In this context, the Gates Foundation launched the Urban Reproductive Health Initiative, a series of
large-scale interventions to promote contraceptive use and urban reproductive health in Senegal, Nigeria,
Kenya and India. The Senegal branch, named ISSU (Initiative Se´ne´galaise de Sante´ Urbaine), implemented
two types of interventions in the cities of Dakar, Mbour and Kaolack between 2011 and 2015.2 Supply-
side interventions aimed at improving the quality of public providers by reducing contraceptive stockouts
and offering additional training in family planning. Demand-side interventions employed mass media and
community outreach to address the benefits of family planning, its acceptance by religious leaders, and
misconceptions about the harmfulness of contraceptives.
These interventions were carried out at a large scale in Dakar, Mbour and Kaolack: 92.8% of public
health facilities received the supply-side interventions, and 85.4% of married women were exposed to at least
one of the media or community programs by 2015. In addition, the Monitoring, Learning and Evaluation
(MLE) project, a collaboration between the Gates Foundation and the Carolina Population Center, collected
data in these three cities between 2011 and 2015 in order to monitor changes in the supply environment
(price, quantity and quality of contraceptive providers) and changes in the percentage of contraceptive users.
This unique setting allows me to incorporate the most common types of family planning interventions—
1The population of Sub-Saharan Africa grew at an average annual rate of 2.73% between 1960 and 2016, resulting in a doubling
of the population approximately every twenty-six years (World Bank Open Data).
2In this article, I refer to Dakar as the department of Dakar and its immediate suburbs Gue´diawaye, Pikine and Mbao.
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implementing an awareness campaign, reducing contraceptive prices, and increasing the quantity and quality
of providers—into a fertility model to compare the effectiveness of these interventions.
The agents in my model are married women living in urban Senegal. At each age, a woman can decide to
be sexually active and whether or not to use birth control, from the time she gets married until menopause.3 If
she opts for birth control, she selects a contraceptive provider based on price, quality and distance among all
the providers that are located within a given distance of her dwelling place. She then becomes pregnant with
a probability that depends on her reproductive and provider choices. In particular, selecting a high quality
provider may increase the effectiveness of birth control and therefore reduce the probability of pregnancy.
The model is dynamic and agents are assumed to be forward looking. In each period of the model, agents
take into account the current cost of pregnancy as well as the value of having a child in the next period when
making their reproductive and provider choices.
In addition, women may be exposed to four community programs implemented by the ISSU awareness
campaign: home visits, community conversations, neighborhood groups and religious talks.4 I allow for these
programs to permanently shift a woman’s contraceptive preferences. Furthermore, I incorporate permanent
unobserved heterogeneity into the model to control for the endogenous exposure to family planning programs
and the endogenous access to providers.
I estimate the model on a uniquely detailed data set from the MLE project. The project collected
longitudinal reproductive data from a representative sample of women in Dakar, Mbour and Kaolack between
2011 and 2015. In addition, a list of all pharmacies and facilities offering contraceptives was established in
each city and data were collected on the quality of care via audits, staff interviews and client exit interviews.
The location of both women and providers were recorded by GPS, and the two samples were linked: we
asked contraceptive users to provide the address of the health facility or pharmacy from which they obtained
their contraceptive, which was matched with the addresses in our provider sample. This remarkable feature
of the data makes it possible to model the choice of providers over the universe of contraceptive providers in
each city.
I solve the model using backwards recursion and estimate the structural parameters by maximum
likelihood. The estimated model is used to carry out several policy experiments and simulation exercises.
3Birth control refers to modern contraceptive methods in this article (less than 3% of married women used traditional methods in
the data).
4The campaign also included radio programs and television programs, but my reduced-form analyses shows that the their impact
was not significant (see section 5).
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I start by decomposing into three different factors the increase in contraceptive use that occurred between
baseline (2011) and endline (2015) in the matched sample of women (i.e. those who are observed in both
waves). During this four year period, (1) women progressed along their life cycle, aging and having children;
(2) the supply environment changed, with an overall increase in provider quality, a decline in contraceptive
prices, and an increase in the number of providers; (3) ISSU carried out its awareness campaign. Results
shows that contraceptive use increased from 25.8% in 2011 to 39.4% in 2015, and that 3.2% of this increase
can be explained by aging, 38.1% by changes in the supply environment, and 58.7% by the awareness
campaign.
Next, I investigate which type of policies could increase contraceptive use in the present environment,
given that a general improvement in quality has already occurred and that many women have already been
exposed to the awareness campaign.5 I find that offering contraceptives for free or raising provider quality to
the maximum would have a moderate impact, increasing the percentage of contraceptive users from 34.1% to
37.5% and 38.0%, respectively.6 On the other hand, entirely eliminating travel costs or exposing women to
all four community programs would have a substantial impact, increasing contraceptive use to 49.0% and
62.2% of married women, respectively.
These simulations suggest that further price reductions and quality improvements would increase
contraceptive use in urban Senegal, but the price and quality of services are not, at their current level, the
main obstacles that prevent women from using contraceptives. Travel costs and cultural barriers, including
the fear of contraceptives and personal opposition, are greater obstacles towards using contraceptives. These
results are consistent with my descriptive analysis of the data, which indicates that a large share of married
women have misconceptions regarding the harmfulness of contraceptives and the majority travel by foot to to
see their contraceptive providers.
My paper makes several methodological contributions to the existing literature on the supply-side
determinants of contraceptive use. As discussed in the next section, the common approach in this literature
is to aggregate provider quality variables at the cluster level and use this as a independent variable in static
models of contraceptive use. However, this approach may not capture well the quality of care that is received,
5These simulations are conducted on a representative sample of women rather than the matched sample (see section 8 for more
details).
6The average annual cost of using contraceptives was already low at 4900 CFA (about 10 dollars) in 2015. Quality is measured
with an index from 0 to 1 and it was equal to 0.701 on average in 2015 (see section 4.4). Hence, raising the index to the maximum is
equivalent to increasing the average quality of services by 42.7%.
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as households often bypass the lowest quality providers to obtain better care (Klemick, Leonard and Masatu
2009). I take a novel approach by explicitly modeling the choice of providers, capturing the relative influence
of each provider on the reproductive outcomes of women.
My paper is also part of a larger literature on the quality of health services in low-income countries. In
recent years, much progress has been made in measuring the quality of care (Leonard and Masatu 2007,
Das, Hammer and Leonard 2008, Das et al. 2012) and evaluating policies to improve quality (Bjo¨rkman and
Svensson 2009, Gertler and Vermeersch 2013, de Walque et al. 2015). But the relationship among quality,
provider choice, and individual outcomes remains less well understood. I am aware of only two other papers
that model the choice of health providers (Klemick, Leonard and Masatu 2009, Cronin, Guilkey and Speizer
2016b). These papers analyze the choice of providers using a cross-sectional sample of patients in rural
Tanzania and Senegal, respectively. The authors find that households are sensitive to travel costs, but typically
bypass the nearest provider to obtain better care. The goal of these studies is to investigate the determinants
of provider choices conditional on being a user. I make a contribution to this literature by analyzing how
price, quality and distance affect the decision to use services or not, the choice of providers, and reproductive
outcomes subsequently.
Finally, my paper is related to a structural literature on the fertility decisions of women (Keane and
Wolpin 2007, Keane and Wolpin 2010, Shapira 2013). The majority of the papers in this literature treat
pregnancies as a decision rather than an outcome, therefore assuming perfect control over one’s fertility.
A few papers explicitly model sexual activity and contraceptive use (Hotz and Miller 1993, Arcidiacono,
Khwaja and Ouyang 2012, Amador 2015, Forsstrom 2017), but these models do not incorporate the choice
of contraceptive providers. Contraceptive prices are typically excluded from the analysis, or in the case of
Amador (2015), an average price is used for all women. To my knowledge, this is the first paper to incorporate
the supply of contraceptives into a dynamic model of fertility and to model the choice of contraceptive
providers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3
presents the structural model. Section 4 describes the context of Senegal and the MLE data. Section 5 provides
reduced-form evidence on the impact of the program. Section 6 discusses estimation and identification.
Section 6 7 presents the estimation results and the model fit. Section 8 presents the policy experiments.
Section 8 concludes.
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SECTION 2
RELATED LITERATURE
2.1. Access to Quality and Contraceptive Use
This paper is part of a larger literature that evaluates the role of the health care environment on the
contraceptive use and fertility of women in developing countries. For example, Angeles, Guilkey and Mroz
(1998) look at the effect of introducing a family planning provider within 30 km of a village on women’s
probability of giving birth in rural Tanzania. The authors make a contribution to the literature by explicitly
modeling the placement of health services: they estimate the probability of having a hospital, a health center,
and a dispensary near the village at time t based on observable community characteristics (e.g. population
size, child mortality rate) as well as unobservable community types. The probability of conceiving in each
year and the three placement equations are jointly estimated, with unobservable types correlated across the set
of equations. Results show that failing to account for the endogenous access to services biases the estimates.
For example, a simple logit model suggests that having a hospital within 5 km of a village significantly
reduces fertility. However, the effect becomes insignificant when placement is modeled, implying that areas
with hospitals had low fertility due to unobservables factors. The authors apply the same approach to rural
communities in Peru (Angeles, Guilkey and Mroz 2005) and find that, in this setting, the placement of family
planning programs can be treated as an exogenous determinant of fertility. Their research shows that the
direction and the magnitude of the placement bias depends on the setting as well as the type of facility
considered.
In contrast, most papers that evaluate the effect of provider quality on contraceptive use do not address
the issue of endogenous access (Feyisetan and Ainsworth 1996, Mensch, Arends-Kuenning and Jain 1996,
Ali 2001, Hong, Montana and Mishra 2006, Arends-Kuenning and Kessy 2007, Yao, Murray and Agadjanian
2013). The approach commonly taken in the literature is to estimate a logit of the form P (Cij = 1) =
Logit(α0 + α1Xij + α2Qj + α3Zj + εij), where Cij is a dummy variable that is equal to one if woman i
in cluster j is using a modern contraceptive method, Xij is a vector of demographic variables (mainly her
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age, education, number of children, wealth, marital status and religion), Qj is a vector of provider quality
variables aggregated at the cluster level, and Zj is a limited number of community controls (e.g. the average
literacy rate or the availability of pipped water in the cluster). α2 is the main coefficient of interest in this
model: it captures a reduced-form effect of provider quality on contraceptive use if E[Qjεij ] = 0. However,
there could be a correlation between access to quality and the unobserved determinants of contraceptive use
for many reasons, including the endogenous placement of providers, selective migration or the targeting of
quality improvement programs.
Another limitation of the existing literature is that the choice of provider is not modeled. Quality variables
are first defined for each provider, then aggregated in some way at the cluster level to proxy the quality
of the health care environment (Qj). Some papers simply take the quality of the nearest provider in each
cluster (Feyisetan and Ainsworth 1996, Hong, Montana and Mishra 2006). Others combine the quality of
the nearest provider of each type (e.g. the nearest hospital, clinic and dispensary) in varying ways (Mensch,
Arends-Kuenning and Jain 1996, Ali 2001, Arends-Kuenning and Kessy 2007). But Klemick, Leonard and
Masatu (2009) show that households often bypass the nearest provider to improve the care that they receive.
Their study was conducted in Arusha, a rural region of Tanzania that has few clinicians, sparse rural road
networks and low population densities, similar to many regions in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Another aggregation method is to average the quality of all providers within a given distance of a cluster
(Cronin, Guilkey and Speizer 2016a). But variation in distance within this buffer area are not taken into
account, and low quality providers necessarily reduce the cluster average, even if women are less likely
to choose them. Yao, Murray and Agadjanian (2013) go one step further by taking a weighted average of
provider variables within a given radius, where weights are the inverse of distance to capture the fact that
farther providers are less likely to be visited. But a cluster with several low quality providers nearby and a
few good providers (possibly attracting many contraceptive users) will still be assigned a low quality score.
In addition, the weight assigned to each facility is a function of distance only and the distance decay function
is arbitrarily chosen.1
Conceptually, a woman’s reproductive or health outcomes are affected by the presence of a health facility
to the extent that she is likely to visit it (aside from externalities or other indirect effects). Thus, the probability
of choosing a facility must be correctly modeled to determine its impact on the individual. Rather than
1In the general case of Inverse Distance Weighting, the weight assigned to facility f is wf = 1/dkf , where df is the distance to
f and k ∈ R+. A special case is k = 0 (Cronin, Guilkey and Speizer 2016a) and k = 1 (Yao, Murray and Agadjanian 2013).
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explicitly modeling the choice of providers, the existing literature relies on simplifying assumptions that
could bias results.2 This paper takes a novel approach by explicitly modeling the choice of providers, along
with contraceptive use and sexual activity. Intuitively, when deciding to use modern contraceptives, a woman
takes into account individual factors as well as the quality and cost associated with each provider. The quality
of a provider affects the satisfaction she derives from a visit and how effectively she uses her contraceptive
method. Thus, improving provider quality raises the option value of using contraceptives, and providers that
are higher in her choice list are more likely to affect her reproductive outcomes.
2.2. Quality of Care Framework
Bruce (1990) developed a framework to evaluate the quality of family planning services that is a standard
in the field of family planning. It includes six aspect of services that are essential to clients: choice of
methods, information given to users, technical competence, interpersonal qualities, continuity mechanisms
and appropriate constellation of services.
Choice of methods refers to the variety of methods that are offered on a reliable basis by the provider. It is
an essential aspect of services because reproductive needs vary along the life cycle (e.g. from wishing to delay
childbearing, to spacing births, then terminating childbearing) and side effects vary by method. The second
aspect of quality is the information given to users (e.g. how to use a given method, possible side effects, etc.),
which affects how effectively a client will use her method. Technical competence refers to the knowledge and
skills demonstrated by providers and the adherence to best-practice protocols. Interpersonal qualities are “the
vehicle by which technical care is implemented and on which its success depends” (Donabedian 1988)—for
example, whether the provider demonstrates empathy, honesty, and respect towards clients, seeks to establish
a dialogue, encourages questions, and so on. Interpersonal qualities affect the satisfaction derived from
seeing a provider, but also the transfer of information and user compliance, and therefore the effectiveness of
using contraceptives. Continuity mechanisms are the systems in place to follow up clients after a visit and to
ensure the continuity of care, such as follow-up calls, appointments or home visits. Finally, an appropriate
constellation of services refers to integrating family planning with other health services to better serve the
2For example, the probability of choosing a provider Pf is equal to one if f is the nearest facility and zero otherwise
(nearest provider approach), Pf is the same for all facilities within a buffer area and zero beyond (simple average approach), or
Pf = (1/d
k
f )/(
∑
F 1/d
k
f
′ ) (Inverse Distance Weighting).
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reproductive and health needs of women (e.g. by combining family planning with prenatal advice, postnatal
care and child health services).
Empirically, these six aspects of services have formed a useful framework to construct quality indicators.
For example, choice of methods is typically measured by the number of methods in stock, technical compe-
tence by one’s training in family planning, and appropriate constellation of services by the number of other
Maternal and Child Health (MCH) services offered (Mensch, Arends-Kuenning and Jain 1996, Magnani et al.
1999, Arends-Kuenning and Kessy 2007). Likewise, I use the Bruce framework to define standard quality
indicators based on the data available (see section 4.4).
Note that this framework makes the process of defining quality indicators relatively straightforward based
on the data available, but the challenge remains upstream to devise survey instruments that accurately capture
these six dimensions of quality. For example, Das, Hammer and Leonard (2008) discuss the benefits of using
vignettes (case-studies that measure providers’ knowledge) and direct observations (attending consultations
to evaluate practice) to measure technical competence, rather than using background data (qualifications,
years of experience, etc.). These and other survey instruments (such as simulated clients) have their own
limitations, but discussing the benefits and shortcomings of each instrument goes beyond the scope of this
paper.3
3I refer the reader to Donabedian (1966) for an early yet outstanding discussion of the complexity of measuring the quality of
medical care, and Das, Hammer and Leonard (2008) to appreciate the progress made since then.
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SECTION 3
MODEL
3.1. Environment and Choice Set
The agents in the model are married women living in the cities of Dakar, Mbour and Kaolack. A woman
makes reproductive decisions annually starting at the age of marriage until she becomes infecund at a fixed
age, assumed to be 47.1 The variables that denote her choices are:
- st: sexually active (1) or not (0) at time t
- bt: using a modern birth control method (1) or not (0) at time t
- ft: if she opts for birth control, she selects a provider f among all the health facilities and pharmacies
that offer a contraceptive method within 5 kilometers of her dwelling place at time t2
The agent chooses a combination of st, bt and ft at the beginning of the period based on her state variables
Ωt. Let j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , J} denote her choice combination among all the possible choice combinations. To
reduce the number of choices, the agent is assumed to use birth control in period t only if she is sexually active
during that period. Hence, her options are to be abstinent (option 1), to have unprotected sex (option 2), or to
have protected sex (options 3 to J). Having protected sex is associated with selecting a contraceptive provider,
therefore the size of the choice set is equal to 2 plus the total number of providers within 5 kilometers.3
After making her reproductive and provider choices, the agent becomes pregnant (ϕt = 1) with a proba-
bility that depends on her sexual activity, birth control status and other reproductive factors. If a pregnancy
occurs, she enters the next period with an additional child.4 The timing of the model is summarized below:
1Sexual activity and contraceptive use are low outside of marriage in Senegal (see section 4.3).
2The majority of women choose a provider within 5 kilometers of their dwelling place, therefore I limit the choice set of
providers to decrease computation time (see section 4.3).
3The size of the choice set varies across women, with a maximum of 89 providers (see section 4.3).
4For simplicity, the model assumes that all pregnancies are carried to term. Likewise, the death of a child is a rare occurrence
that is not modeled. The under-five mortality rate is 47 per 1000 live births in Senegal and is likely to be lower in urban areas (World
Bank Open Data 2015).
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tΩt
Choose st, bt, ft
ϕt realized
+1 child if ϕt = 1
t+ 1
Ωt+1
3.2. State Variables
The agent observes the following state variables at the beginning of the period, before making her
choices:
- t: age
- nt: number of children
- ϕt−1: pregnant (1) or not (0) in the last period
- ϕt−2: pregnant (1) or not (0) two periods ago
- pft: price of pills and injectables at provider f at time t, converted into an annual cost and averaged5
- dft: Euclidean distance from provider f to her dwelling place at time t
- qft: an index measuring the quality of family planning services provided by provider f at time t (from
0 to 1). This variable is set to 0 for pharmacies.
- hft: a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if she choses a health facility and 0 otherwise
- ξt: number of ISSU community activities ever exposed to at time t, from 0 to 4 (home visits, community
conversations, neighborhood groups and religious talks)
- e: level of education, equal to none (0), primary (1) or secondary and above (2)
- eh: husband’s level of education, equal to none (0), primary (1) or secondary and above (2)
- ω: a measure of wealth at baseline, categorized into poorest (0), middle (1), and richeset (2)
- ak: dummies that indicate whether she got married before the age of 18 (a0 = 1), between 18 and 23
(a1 = 1), or after 23 (a2 = 1)
5These are the two most popular methods (see section 4.6).
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- χ: the number of good quality health facilities (qft > 0.65) within 2 kilometers of her dwelling place
at baseline6
- µ: her permanent type, which is known to the woman but unobserved by the econometrician
Note that provider variables (pft, dft, and qft) are taken from the data as given. The agent updates
them in each period and makes a no-change forecast when computing the future value of her choices. My
assumption is that women do not take into consideration future changes in the supply environment when
making their current reproductive decisions.7
3.3. Preferences
In each period, the utility associated with choice j and state variable Ωt is defined by the following
function:
uj(Ωt) = α1st + bt
[
α2 +
L∑
l=1
α3,lI(µ = l) + hft(α4 + α5qft)
+ dft
(
α6 +
2∑
k=1
α7,kI(ω = k)
)
+ pft
(
α8 +
2∑
k=1
α9,kI(ω = k)
)
+ α10ξt
]
+ nt
(
α11 +
L∑
l=1
α12,lI(µ = l) +
2∑
k=1
α13,kI(e = k) +
2∑
k=1
α14,kI(e
h = k)
)
+ n2t
(
α15 +
L∑
l=1
α16,lI(µ = l) +
2∑
k=1
α17,kI(e = k) +
2∑
k=1
α18,kI(e
h = k)
)
+ ϕt
(
α19 + α20t+ α21ϕt−1 + α22(1− ϕt−1)ϕt−2
)
(3.1)
α1 is the marginal utility of having sex. α2 is the marginal disutility of using contraceptives, which
captures the inconvenience of using contraceptives, misconceptions about side effects and personal opposition.
This disutility depends on a number of variables, including a woman’s unobserved type unobserved type
629.4% of health facilities have a quality index greater than 0.65 at baseline.
7Modeling the evolution of the supply environment (e.g. in a general equilibrium setting, with women’s choices affecting the
price and quality of services) would be computationally burdensome and would not change the agent’s optimization problem in
this case. The main advantage would be to conduct more sophisticated policy simulations. For example, in section 8, I increase the
quality of services in 2011 to the maximum and simulate women’s choices until the age of menopause. In this experiment, quality is
increased and maintained at the same level over time. With a general equilibrium model, one could simulate a one period increase in
quality and let the system evolve. Quality might deteriorate over time as a result of an increase in demand, which would mitigate the
initial increase in contraceptive use.
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µ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , L} and the quality of her provider qft. Note that qft is interacted with hft, since the quality
index is only defined for health facilities. In addition, women take into account the cost of traveling to a
provider and contraceptive prices.8 The effects of both distance and price depend on a woman’s wealth
level ω. I also allow for family planning awareness programs to permanently shift a woman’s contraceptive
preferences (α10).
Fertility preferences are captured by the parameters α11 through α18. The quadratic specification allows
for the utility function to increase as a woman starts having children, then decrease if nt exceeds her ideal
number of children. nt and n2t are interacted with e, since education may affect the taste for children and the
opportunity cost of raising children. Fertility preferences also depend on a woman’s type and the level of
education of her husband eh.
Finally, a woman incurs a cost of pregnancy if she becomes pregnant (ϕt = 1). The cost of pregnancy
may increase with age t and if her last pregnancy was one period ago (ϕt−1 = 1) or two periods ago
((1− ϕt−1)ϕt−2 = 1). Hence, α21 and α22 capture birth spacing preferences.
The basic mechanisms of the model are enshrined in the utility function: women tend to have unprotected
sex at the beginning of their marriage because the marginal utility of having sex is positive, as well as the
marginal utility of having their first child.9 After giving birth, a woman may wish to delay her next pregnancy
to avoid closely spaced births or to limit her family size. Abstinence provides perfect protection, but she
must forgo α1 in this case. Alternatively, she could use birth control to reduce the probability of pregnancy,
but there is a utility cost associated with contraceptives. The decision to use birth control or not will partly
depend on the quality of available providers, as well as the price she must pay and the distance she must
travel to obtain contraceptives.
3.4. Program Exposure
Women can be exposed to up to four family planning programs at midterm (2011) and endline (2015).
These interventions were not randomized, thus ξt could be correlated with the unobserved determinants of
fertility and contraceptive preferences. I control for this endogenous relationship by allowing for µ to shift
fertility and contraceptive preferences in the utility function, and also to affect exposure as follows:
8I do not model a woman’s time constraint, thus α6 captures both transportation and time costs.
9Most women do not use contraceptives until their first child is born. Merely 2.6% of women with no children use contraceptives
at baseline.
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ξt = β0 +
L∑
l=1
β1,lI(µ = l) + β2I(y = 2015) +
2∑
k=1
β3,kI(e = k)
+
2∑
k=1
β4,kI(ω = k) + β5t+ εt (3.2)
where εt ∼ N (0, σ2). β2 captures the additional exposure at endline, compared to midterm. This
equation is not estimated at baseline, since ISSU programs were not implemented yet.
3.5. Pregnancies
Denote Pj(Ωt) the probability of becoming pregnant in period t as a function of choice j and state
variables Ωt. Pj(Ωt) is modeled according to the following logit specification:
ln
[
P (ϕt = 1)
P (ϕt = 0)
]
=

0 if st = 0 or t ≥ 47
γ0 +
L∑
l=1
γ1,lI(µ = l) + γ2t+ γ3t
2 + γ4ϕt−1 + γ5bt if
st = 1 and t < 47
(3.3)
The probability of pregnancy is equal to zero if a woman abstains from having sex or reaches the age of
47. Otherwise, the probability of pregnancy is a function of age to capture the decline in fecundity towards the
end of the reproductive life cycle. In addition, women who were pregnant in the last period (ϕt−1 = 1) are
less likely to become pregnant due to breastfeeding. Using birth control (bt = 1) also reduces the probability
of pregnancy. Finally, γ1 captures permanent unobserved heterogeneity in fecundity.
3.6. Initial Conditions and Types
Agents are assumed to start their reproductive life once they get married because there is little sexual
activity and contraceptive use outside of marriage in Senegal (see section 4.3). The initial number of children
in the model is therefore zero. The other initial conditions in the model are a woman’s level of education
e, her husband’s level of education eh, her baseline wealth level ω, and her age of marriage category ak.
These variables, as well as a woman’s access to quality at baseline χ, may be correlated with the unobserved
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determinants of contraceptive use and fertility. For example, women with stronger fertility preferences
may choose to get married younger. I control for this endogenous relationship by allowing for the age of
marriage to determine her unobserved type, which shifts her fertility and contraceptive preferences in the
utility function. Denote P (µ = l) the probability that the agent is type l ∈ {0, 1, . . . , L}. Type probabilities
are modeled according to a multinomial logit specification (Heckman and Singer 1984, Shen 2009, Keane
and Wolpin 2010), where the coefficients for type zero are normalized to zero:
ln
[
P (µ = l)
P (µ = 0)
]
= τ l0 +
2∑
k=1
τ l1,kI(e = k) +
2∑
k=1
τ l2,kI(e
h = k) +
2∑
k=1
τ l3,kI(ω = k)
+
2∑
k=1
τ l4,kak + τ
l
5χ (3.4)
3.7. The Optimization Problem
The agent is forward-looking and assumed to maximize, at each age, the present value of her expected
lifetime utility from that age onward. The optimization problem can be defined recursively in a dynamic
programming framework. Conditional on her type µ, a woman in state Ωt will chose the choice combination
j that gives her the highest utility vj(Ωt|µ)+εjt, where εjt is a Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) preference
shock and vj(Ωt|µ) is the choice-specific value function:
vj(Ωt|µ) = Pj(Ωt|µ)
[
uj(Ωt|µ, ϕt = 1) + δV (Ωt+1|Ωt, µ, ϕt = 1)
]
+ (1− Pj(Ωt|µ))
[
uj(Ωt|µ, ϕt = 0) + δV (Ωt+1|Ωt, µ, ϕt = 0)
]
(3.5)
uj(Ωt|µ) is the per-period utility of choice j, Pj(Ωt|µ) is the probability of pregnancy conditional on
choice j and type µ, δ is the discount factor, and V (Ωt+1|µ) is the future value function, which is the expected
value of the best option in the next state:
V (Ωt+1|µ) = E max
j
[
vj(Ωt+1|µ) + jt+1
]
(3.6)
Equation 3.5 shows that the value of choice j is the sum of two terms. The first term is the probability of
becoming pregnant conditional on j times the value of becoming pregnant, which is equal to the current utility
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uj(Ωt|µ, ϕt = 1) plus the discounted expected value of having a child in the next period δV (Ωt+1|Ωt, µ, ϕt =
1). The second term is the probability of avoiding a pregnancy conditional on j times the value of not
becoming pregnant, which is equal to the current utility uj(Ωt|µ, ϕt = 0) plus the discounted expected value
of having the same number of children in the next period δV (Ωt+1|Ωt, µ, ϕt = 0).
Denote pj(Ωt|µ) the probability of choosing j conditional on state Ωt and type µ. I assume a nested logit
error structure, which provides the following closed-form solution for the conditional choice probabilities:
pj(Ωt|µ) = e
vj(Ωt|µ)
ev1(Ωt|µ) + ev2(Ωt|µ) +
(
J∑
j=3
evj(Ωt|µ)/ρ
)ρ for j ∈ {1, 2}
pj(Ωt|µ) =
evj(Ωt|µ)/ρ
(
J∑
j=3
evj(Ωt|µ)/ρ
)ρ−1
ev1(Ωt|µ) + ev2(Ωt|µ) +
(
J∑
j=3
evj(Ωt|µ)/ρ
)ρ for j ∈ {3, . . . , J} (3.7)
where 1− ρ is a measure of correlation among the provider nest. The introduction of permanent unobserved
heterogeneity in the model relaxes the IIA assumption and captures the permanent correlation across
choices, program exposure and pregnancies. In addition, the nested logit errors capture the per-period
correlation among provider choices.10 A small ρ implies that women compare the value of the best providers
(j ∈ {3, . . . , J}) to the value of abstinence (j = 1) and unprotected sex (j = 2).11
The GEV distributional assumption also provides a closed-form solution for the future value function:
Vj(Ωt+1|µ) = ln
∑
J
e
ev1(Ωt+1|µ)+ev2(Ωt+1|µ)+
(
J∑
j=3
evj(Ωt+1|µ)/ρ
)ρ+ γ (3.8)
where γ is Euler’s constant. The solution to the optimization problem can be regarded as solving vj for all
choices and possible future states. I close the model by assuming that women die at the age of 70—the life
expectancy of women in urban Senegal (2013 Senegal Census Data)—and setting the future value equal to
10I do not further decompose the provider nest into sub-nests (e.g. dispensary, clinic and hospital, or public versus private)
because I assume that price, distance, and quality are the fundamental variables that determine provider choices in this context.
Households in Senegal generally do not have health insurance.
11For ρ close to zero,
(
J∑
j=3
evj(Ωt|µ)/ρ
)ρ
is approximately equal to exponential of the value of the best provider.
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zero in the terminal period. The solution method proceeds by backwards recursion starting at T = 70.12
Equation 3.5 provides a scalar value for all vj(ΩT ) since V (ΩT+1) is equal to zero. It is then possible to
compute V (ΩT ) for all states in period T using equation 3.8. Given V (ΩT ), I can compute all vj(ΩT−1) in
period T − 1 with equation 3.5, and so forth the model is solved recursively back to the first period. Equation
3.7 provides the formula to compute the conditional choice probabilities once the model is solved.
12From age 47 to 70 the number of children is fixed and the only choices are to be sexually active or not.
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SECTION 4
DATA
4.1. Country Overview
Senegal is a francophone country in West Africa with a high fertility rate (4.8 children per women on
average, World Bank Open Data 2016). The population has grown from three million in 1960 to fifteen
million in 2016, with an average annual growth rate of 2.84% during this period (see appendix figure 9.1).
The country has a stable political environment, marked by the peaceful transition of power since gaining its
independence from France in 1960. Nearly half of the population is living in urban areas and a quarter in
the region of Dakar, the capital (2013 Census). Senegal is part of the Sahel region, a belt to the south of the
Sahara with a semi-arid climate and a predominantly muslim culture.1 The study of contraceptive use and
fertility in this region is of particular interest since Sahelian countries—including Senegal, Mauritania, Mali,
Niger, Chad, Sudan and Eritrea—are among the countries with the highest fertility rates in the world.
4.2. The MLE Project
The Monitoring, Learning and Evaluation (MLE) project collected data from women living in three cities
in Senegal: Dakar, Mbour and Kaolack. The region of Dakar is the largest urban area in Senegal, with a total
population of 3.1 million inhabitants (2013 Census). The survey in Dakar covered the inner city and the
neighboring suburbs of Gue´diawaye, Pikine and Mbao. Mbour and Kaolack are secondary cities that have
approximately half a million inhabitants.
A multi-stage stratified sampling design was used to obtain a sample of women that was representative
of each city at baseline (2011).2 Women were then tracked and interviewed at endline (2015), with an
196.1% of the population in Senegal is muslim (EDS-Continue 2015).
2The primary sampling units (clusters) were first divided into poor and non-poor based on the overall characteristics of the
cluster (types of houses, access to pipped water, etc.). An equal number of poor and non-poor clusters were then selected in each city
with a probability that was proportional to the size of each cluster. The urban poor were oversampled as a result. All the statistics
provided in this paper are unweighted.
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Figure 4.1: Sahel Region
additional sub-sample interviewed at midterm (2013) in Gue´diawaye, Pikine and Mbao. In each survey
round, information was collected on fertility preferences, reproductive behavior, the choice of contraceptive
providers, and the history of births. In Dakar, data was also collected from a representative sample of men in
2011 and 2015 to learn about their fertility preferences and their attitude towards family planning. These two
samples are cross-sectional and smaller than the women’s sample, with 2270 men interviewed in 2011 and
2214 men interviewed in 2015.
In addition, a list of all pharmacies and health facilities offering reproductive health services was
established in each city based on official registries and field investigation. They were audited in 2011
and 2015 to gather information on MCH services, contraceptive prices, management practices and staff
qualification. In each health facility, up to four staff members involved in the delivery of reproductive
health services were randomly selected and interviewed. Questions were asked regarding their qualifications,
knowledge of family planning, and practices during family planning consultations. The major health facilities
in each city—those who had a high-volume of activity, were well staffed and offered a wide range of
methods—were also subject to client exit interviews. Fifty women were selected in each high-volume facility
to collect information on their experience after their reproductive health visit. Finally, women were linked to
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their contraceptive providers. Women who were using a modern method at the time of the survey reported the
address of the health facility or pharmacy from which they last obtained their contraceptive. These addresses
were then matched to the providers in our master list.
The purpose of the MLE project was to collect data to monitor and evaluate the ISSU project, which
implemented supply-side and demand-side interventions between 2011 and 2015 in the three cities. All
interventions started after the baseline data was collected. The supply-side interventions focused on training
family planning providers in the public sector and implementing the Informed Push Model (IPM) to reduce
stockouts. The IPM is a centralized distribution system where trained logisticians are responsible for contact-
ing providers and re-supplying them in contraceptives on a regular basis.3 The demand-side interventions
raised awareness of the benefits of family planning, discussed the acceptance of family planning by religious
leaders, and addressed misconceptions about the harmfulness of contraceptives. The media component of the
intervention included radio and television programs, and the community component included home visits,
community conversations, neighborhood groups and religious talks.
All interventions ended in 2015, except for the IPM system, which was extended to the rest of the country
after 2015. The interventions were well funded by the Gates Foundation and carried across the board in the
three cities: 92.8% of public health facilities received the supply-side interventions, representing 88.4% of
the contraceptive providers chosen by women in 2015. In addition, 85.4% of women in the estimation sample
were exposed to at least one of the six media and community programs by 2015, and 40.2% of were exposed
to at least one of the four community programs by 2015.
4.3. Sample Selection
The baseline sample includes 9614 women between the ages of 15 and 49, of which 6927 were suc-
cessfully interviewed at endline.4 The sample selection process is described in table 4.1 and starts with all
9614 women. At each step, I delete all person-year observations that do not meet the selection criterion. For
example, if a woman is single at baseline and midterm but married at endline, I keep her endline observation.
3(Daff et al., 2014) describe in detail the IPM and how it resolved issues with the previous “pull-based” system, which relied on
providers traveling to a local warehouse and using their own cash on hand to buy contraceptives.
4193 women were not eligible for a follow-up because they were just visiting the household at baseline. Of the 9421 eligible
women, 81.46% were tracked in the study sites, 12.9% had moved out of the study sites, 0.8% were deceased and 4.8% were not
followed up. The response rate among those who were tracked was 90.27%.
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Table 4.1: Sample Selection Process
Reason Dropped Remaining
Age inconsistent 25 9589
Age above 46 318 9271
Single 3368 5903
Infecund 96 5807
Uncommon method 6 5801
Missing contraceptive use 5 5796
Abstinent but became pregnant 9 5787
Missing birth history 2 5785
More than 12 children 1 5784
Chose a health facility beyond 5 km 20 5764
No health facilities within 5 km 1 5763
Chose a pharmacy beyond the nearest five 7 5756
Missing age or marriage 49 5707
Married before 10 5 5702
Age of marriage inconsistent 3 5699
Missing age of oldest child 1 5698
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25 women are dropped because their age is largely inconsistent across the two waves, and 318 are
dropped because they are older than 46 at baseline (the last decision period in the model). There is limited
sexual activity and contraceptive use outside of marriage in Senegal (4.5% of single women had sex in the
past three months and merely 3.8% used contraceptives in the full baseline sample), therefore I limit the
sample to married women. Most contraceptive users choose condoms, pills, injectables, implants or IUDs. A
few women selected less common methods (sterilization, emergency contraception, spermicides, etc.) and
are excluded from the sample. I also drop a small number of women who selected a health facility beyond 5
kilometers or a pharmacy beyond the nearest five.
Table 4.2: Person-Year Observations
City Baseline Midterm Endline Total
Dakar 2489 1425 1888 5802
Mbour 1114 – 953 2067
Kaolack 1181 – 936 2117
Total 4784 1425 3777 9986
The final sample is broken-down by city in table 4.2. There are 4784 observations at baseline, 1425 at
midterm and 3777 at endline, for a total of 9986 person-year observations. 58.1% of these observations are in
Dakar, 20.7% in Mbour and 21.2% in Kaolack.
Table 4.3: Provider Sample
Baseline Providers Endline Providers
City Health Facilities Pharmacies Health Facilities Pharmacies
Dakar 122 315 182 412
Mbour 13 27 19 27
Kaolack 25 32 27 34
Total 160 374 228 473
Dakar also has the largest number of contraceptive providers, with 122 health facilities and 315 pharma-
cies at baseline (table 4.3). In total, there are 160 health facilities and 374 pharmacies in the estimation sample
at baseline. The number of providers increases over time, with 228 health facilities and 473 pharmacies
in the estimation sample at endline. Provider data was not collected at midterm except in the suburbs of
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Gue´diawaye, Pikine and Mbao, so I apply the endline supply environment to the midterm sample of women.
Thus, I allow women to choose from the endline sample of providers in 2013.
The size of the provider choice set varies by city and across women. The average choice set includes 34.7
providers at baseline and 45.5 providers at endline. The largest choice set includes 70 providers at baseline
and 89 at endline. Note that there are always five pharmacies in a woman’s choice set, thus the largest choice
set includes 84 health facilities plus 5 pharmacies.
Table 4.4: Provider Choice Set
Baseline Endline
City Min Max Average Min Max Average
Dakar 8 70 46.2 9 89 65.3
Mbour 18 18 18 13 24 23.8
Kaolack 10 28 26.2 6 31 27.9
Total 8 70 34.7 6 89 45.5
4.4. Model Variables
Table 4.5 provides summary statistics for the permanent characteristics of women in the estimation
sample. e is the highest level of education at the age of marriage, categorized into none (0), primary (1), and
secondary or more (2). The educational attainment of women is limited and typically doesn’t change after
marriage, therefore it is treated it as a permanent characteristic of women in the model. 42.6% of women
have no education, 36.4% have primary education, and merely 21.0% have secondary or more (I combine
secondary and tertiary because only 3.6% of women have tertiary education).
eh is the husband’s level of education, which is defined in the same way as e. A larger share of husbands
have no education (47.3%), but those who go to school are more likely to reach the secondary level (32.0%).
ω captures a woman’s wealth status at baseline. First, I construct a wealth index by running a principal
component analysis on a list of household variables and keeping the first component. These variables capture
the living standards of a woman at baseline, such as having finished floors and walls, the number of rooms
in her house, having access to electricity and running water, owning a stove, etc. Next, I construct ω by
dividing the wealth index into three quantiles (poorest, middle, richest) using the entire sample of households
at baseline.
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I divide the age of marriage into three categories: before 18, between 18 and 23, and after 23. The
majority of women (50.4%) get married between 18 and 23. Finally, χ is equal to the number of health
facilities that have a quality index greater than 0.65 and are located less than 2 kilometers from a woman
baseline.
Table 4.5 provides summary statistics for the time-varying demographic variables in the estimation
sample. A woman is considered sexually active if she had sex in the past three months. 85.2% of women
are sexually active and 22.8% are using contraceptives at baseline. By endline, 36.6% of women are using
contraceptives.
Table 4.5: Permanent Demographic Characteristics
Variable Description Average Min Max
I(e = 0) No education 0.426 0 1
I(e = 1) Primary education 0.364 0 1
I(e = 2) Secondary education 0.210 0 1
I(eh = 0) Husb. no education 0.473 0 1
I(eh = 1) Husb. primary education 0.207 0 1
I(eh = 2) Husb. secondary education 0.320 0 1
I(ω = 0) Poorest 0.355 0 1
I(ω = 1) Middle 0.337 0 1
I(ω = 2) Richest 0.308 0 1
a1 Married before 18 0.260 0 1
a2 Married between 18-23 0.504 0 1
a3 Married after 23 0.236 0 1
χ Baseline access 2.69 0 9
The average number of children increases from 2.98 at baseline to 3.24 at endline. Note that the endline
sample includes women who were not married yet at baseline. Thus, the endline number of children is larger
if one restricts the data to the matched baseline-endline sample (3.75 on average).
The timing of pregnancies is constructed by dividing the history of births into 12 month intervals.
ϕt−2 = 1 if a woman gave birth 12 to 23 months before the interview, ϕt−1 = 1 if she gave birth 0 to 11
months before the interview, and ϕt = 1 if a child is born 1 to 12 months after the interview.
ξt is the number of ISSU community activities that a woman has been ever exposed to at time t, including
home visits, community conversations, neighborhood groups and religious talks. Exposure is equal to zero
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for all women at baseline. At endline, women have been exposed to 0.684 programs on average; 59.8% have
not received any programs, 20.8% have received one, 12.0% have received two, 6.1% have received three,
and 1.3% have received all four.
Table 4.6: Time-Varying Demographic Characteristics
Baseline Midterm Endline
Variable Description Average Average Average Min Max
t Age 30.9 32.1 32.7 15 46
st Sexually active 0.852 0.862 0.860 0 1
bt Using birth control 0.228 0.354 0.366 0 1
nt Number of children 2.98 3.19 3.24 0 12
ϕt Pregnant in t 0.190 0.158 – 0 1
ϕt−1 Pregnant in t− 1 0.214 0.197 0.168 0 1
ϕt−2 Pregnant in t− 2 0.209 0.180 0.173 0 1
ξt Program exposure 0 0.484 0.684 0 4
Table 4.7 provides summary statistics for the provider variables in the estimation sample. The quality
index measures the quality of family planning services offered by health facilities (it is not defined for
pharmacies). This index is an average of six quality indicators that are standard in the family planning
literature and based on the Bruce framework (see section 2.2). The first indicator is the number of methods
(condoms, pills, injectables, implants and IUDs) offered by the health facility at time t. The second is a
dummy variable that is equal to one if pills and injectables (the most popular methods) are in stock at time t.
The third quality indicator is the percentage of staff members (among those who offer reproductive health
services) that do not impose any restrictions on contraceptives at time t. Restrictions include requiring women
to have their husbands’ consent, to be within a certain age, or to have a minimum number of children in order
to receive contraceptives. Together, these first three indicators capture the choice of methods in the Bruce
framework. The fourth indicator is the percentage of family planning employees who received a training
from ISSU at time t. The fifth indicator is the number of other MCH services that are offered at the health
facility, which captures the constellation of services in the Bruce framework.5 The last indicator is a dummy
variable that is equal to one if the health facility has all of the following basic medical material at time t: a
5This indicator includes eleven MCH services: prenatal care, delivery, emergency obstetrics, postnatal care, post-abortion
care, STI diagnostic and treatment, voluntary counseling and testing, and four types of child health services (vaccination, growth
monitoring, respiratory illness and oral re-hydration therapy).
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speculum, a tenaculum, a sponge clamp, antiseptics, cotton and gloves. I divide “number of methods” by 5
and “number of other MCH activities” by 11 to have indicators that range from 0 and 1, then I average the six
indicators to obtain a quality index.
pf,t captures the average annual cost of obtaining contraceptives from provider f at time t. This variable
is based on the price of pills and injectables, which are the most popular methods in urban Senegal (see section
4.6). An injectable shot usually provides protection for 3 months and pills are sold in packs of 28. To obtain an
annual cost, I set the price variable equal to (4×price of an injectable shot + 12×price of a pack of pills)/2.
Prices are expressed in thousands of CFA francs (1 dollar equals 500 CFA francs approximately).
Finally, the centroid of clusters and the exact location of providers were recorded by GPS, which allows
me to compute the Euclidean distance from a woman’s dwelling place to each contraceptive provider.6 The
largest value taken by dft is 5.88 kilometers.
Table 4.7: Provider Variables
Baseline Endline
Average Average Min Max
Number of methods 4.08 4.55 1 5
Pills or injectables in stock 0.919 0.965 0 1
No restrictions 0.361 0.606 0 1
ISSU trained 0 0.385 0 1
Number of other MCH services 7.88 7.80 2 11
Basic medical material 0.519 0.632 0 1
Quality index (qf,t) 0.555 0.701 0.064 0.985
Price (pf,t) 4.98 4.90 0 21
Distance (df,t) 2.38 2.50 0.002 5.88
4.5. Provider Choice
It can be seen in table 4.7 that the supply environment has improved between 2011 and 2015: the number
of providers increased from 160 to 228, while the price of contraceptives declined slightly and the quality
index increased on average. Figure 9.2 in the appendix provides the distribution of prices for public and
6Clusters correspond to urban census tracts and cover small areas, typically the size of a neighborhood. Women who subsequently
moved from their baseline cluster were tracked and the exact location of their new dwelling place taken by GPS. I refer to the location
of a woman as her dwelling place in both cases.
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private providers. Public providers were cheaper on average in both waves. In addition, the government
passed a decree in 2010 to set the price of contraceptives in the public sector, which resulted in a convergence
of prices among public providers by 2015. Table 4.8 indicates that 83.6% of users in 2011 and 92.1% of
users in 2015 obtained their method from a public provider. The most common choice is the health post, a
relatively small and public health facility.
Table 4.8: Provider Types (%)
Baseline Endline
Type Available Chosen Available Chosen
Hospital 1.3 8.7 1.4 3.5
Health center 5.8 22.3 3.9 16.5
Health post 16.7 49.8 15.7 66.2
Other public 3.2 2.9 4.9 5.9
Private health facility 3.0 5.9 6.7 1.8
Pharmacy 70.0 10.5 67.5 6.1
Table 4.9 indicates that poorer women are more likely to choose providers that are cheaper and closer.
Overall, the data suggests that distance is a significant determinant of provider choices. For example, client
exit interviews reveal that 60.8% of women travelled by foot to their reproductive health appointments, 21.4%
used public transportation, 13.7% employed taxis, 1.2% used a personal car, and 2.8% used a cart, motorcycle
or other form of transportation in 2011.
Nonetheless, the majority of contraceptive users (61.7% in 2011 and 57.7% in 2015) bypass the nearest
provider to obtain better care on average. Those who bypass the nearest provider choose a provider that is on
average 0.95 km farther, offers 0.11 more methods and 0.56 more MCH services in 2015 (table 4.10). In
addition, these providers are more likely to impose no restrictions (+3.9 percentage points) and have a greater
share of of ISSU trained staff (+2.9 percentage points).
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Table 4.9: Provider Choice by
Wealth Status
Baseline Endline
Price (1000 CFA)
Poorest 1.768 1.375
Middle 1.938 1.353
Richest 2.111 1.684
All 1.943 1.460
Distance (km)
Poorest 0.979 0.836
Middle 1.080 0.944
Richest 1.078 1.032
All 1.048 0.935
Nearest (%)
Poorest 37.3 47.6
Middle 40.1 40.9
Richest 37.4 38.2
All 38.3 42.3
Table 4.10: Nearest vs. Chosen Provider in 2015
(Among Users Who Bypass)
Nearest Chosen
Number of methods 3.80 4.47
Pills or injectables in stock 0.948 0.929
No restrictions 0.513 0.526
Recently trained 0.597 0.668
Number of other MCH services 7.84 8.99
Basic medical material 0.587 0.602
Quality index 0.686 0.739
Distance 0.50 1.63
4.6. Reproductive Preferences
Table 4.5 shows that merely 22.8% of married women use contraceptives at baseline (compared to 58%
in the United-States, Population Reference Bureau 2015). The most popular methods are injectables (43.6%
of users at baseline), followed by pills (36.3%), implants (7.6%), condoms (7.7%) and IUDs (4.8%).
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Figure 4.2: Fertility Preferences
Despite the low prevalence of contraceptives, most women desire to limit or space their pregnancies.
61.8% of married women report an ideal number of children between three and six at baseline (figure 7.1).
25.1% provide a non-numerical answer, such as “I do not know”, “I have not thought about it” or “it is up to
God”. Among those who provide a numerical answer, the ideal family size is on average 5.0 children. Men
tend to have stronger fertility preferences than women. 39.8% of married men report an ideal number of
children between three and six at baseline, and 38.5% provide a non-numerical answer. Among those who
provide a numerical answer, the ideal number of children is 6.0 on average. In terms of birth spacing, 91.4%
of married women and 93.9% of married men prefer to have a two to four year interval between children
(figure 4.3). Merely 0.4% of married women and 2.0% of married men want a birth interval shorter than two
years.
In addition, 26.1% of married women who are pregnant report that their pregnancy was unwanted when
it occurred. Among married women who are not pregnant, 21.2% are sexually active, not using any type of
modern contraceptives, but state that it would be an issue if they became pregnant in the coming weeks. The
main reasons they provide for not using contraceptives are fear of side effects (24.8%), currently breastfeeding
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Figure 4.3: Spacing Preferences
(22.3%), partner’s opposition (11.7%), personal opposition (11.2%), health issues (10.7%) and postpartum
amenorrhea (10.2%). Note that there are widespread misconceptions about the harmfulness of contraceptives.
For example, a significant share of women believe that people who use contraceptives end-up having health
issues (57.5%) or that injectables cause irreversible sterility (32.2%) at baseline.
The data suggest that most couples do not discuss their fertility preferences (table 4.11). In addition,
80.6% of women need their husband’s consent to use contraceptives. However, the same percentage report
that they can convince their husband to use family planning. Note that family planning is generally approved
in urban Senegal. For example, 77.8% of married women and 67.8% of married men at baseline agree that
couples who practice family planning have a better quality of life than those who do not. Finally, the decision
to have children is generally determined by both spouses, and women are the ones who primarily decide
which contraceptive method to use.
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Table 4.11: Communication With Husband and Agency Over Reproductive
Decisions at Baseline (%)
Yes No You Joint Husb. Other1
Ever talked about number
of children with husband 30.1 69.9
Ever talked about FP with husband 54.8 45.2
Need husband’s consent to use FP 80.6 19.4
Can convince husband to use FP 79.9 20.1
Who decides num. of children mainly 24.2 32.1 14.4 29.3
Who chooses the method mainly 51.2 34.1 8.1 6.6
1 The most common free responses are “It is up to God” and “We have never talked about it”.
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SECTION 5
REDUCED-FORM ANALYSIS
I employ a fixed-effects model to evaluate the impact of the awareness campaign on contraceptive use
and to explore various impact mechanisms. The structural model expresses the decision to use contraceptives
as a function of a woman’s age, number of children (interacted with education and husband’s education),
time since last pregnancy, program exposure, the supply environment and several time invariant variables
(education, husband’s education, baseline wealth status, age of marriage and baseline access to quality). I
exclude the supply environment from my reduced-form model and drop the time invariant variables:
bt = λ0 + λ1t+ λ2t
2 + nt
( 2∑
k=1
λ3,kI(e = k) +
2∑
k=1
λ4,kI(e
h = k)
)
+ n2t
( 2∑
k=1
λ5,kI(e = k) +
2∑
k=1
λ6,kI(e
h = k)
)
+ λ7ϕt−1 + λ8(1− ϕt−1)ϕt−2
+ λ9ξt + ν + t (5.1)
where t is a woman’s age, e her level of education, eh her husband’s education, ϕt−1 her pregnancy
status one year ago, ϕt−2 her pregnancy status two years ago, and ν is an individual fixed-effect. I estimate
this model with fixed effects, using the sample of women who have at least two observations (3391 women).
This model is relatively simple and static, but it controls for permanent unobserved heterogeneity. Essentially,
the model captures the change in contraceptive use that is associated with program exposure by controlling
for the baseline level of contraceptive use.
I estimate two versions of equation 5.1. The first model includes the following exposure variables: a
dummy that is equal to one if a woman has ever heard any ISSU radio program, a dummy that is equal to
one if a woman has ever heard any ISSU television program, and the number of ISSU community program
that a woman has every been exposed to from zero to four. I find that the television program did not have a
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significant impact on contraceptive use (table 5.1). The radio coefficient is positive but not significant at the
10% level (pvalue = 0.18). In contrast, the parameter associated with the community variable is significant at
the 1% level and is equal to 0.046, which implies that the probability of using contraceptives increases by
4.6 percentage points with each additional community program that a woman receives. Simulations suggest
that exposing all women to the four community activities at endline would increase contraceptive use from
39.4% to 55.6%. In addition, this model fits well the average level of contraceptive use at baseline (25.8%)
and endline (39.4%) in the matched sample.
I exclude the radio and television variables in the second model and obtain the same results. Since
radio and television do not have a significant impact on the decision to use contraceptives, I only include the
community variable in my structural model. This reduces the computation burden of the model—including
radio and television would add two more probability of exposure equations, one for each type of program.
Next, I investigate different channels through which community programs can affect the decision to use
contraceptives. The awareness campaign included home visits, community conversations, neighborhood
groups and religious talks that discussed the benefits of limiting family size, addressed misconceptions about
the harmfulness of contraceptives, and discussed the place of family planning in Islam. Table 5.2 shows the
impact of the community programs on several dependent variables. The control variables are similar to the
previous fixed-effects models. “Misconceptions” is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a woman agrees
that people who use contraceptives end up having health issues. Women who were not using any type of birth
control method were asked to provide a reason. “Opposition” and “husband opposition” are dummy variables
that are equal to one if a woman reported personal opposition and husband opposition, respectively. “Benefits”
is equal to one if a woman agrees that couples who practice family planning have a better quality of life than
those who do not. “Ideal number” is the total number of children that a woman would like to have ideally
(non numerical answers are excluded). Finally, “ideal spacing” is the ideal age interval between two children.
I find that the awareness campaign significantly reduced misconceptions and personal opposition. The
campaign also significantly increased awareness about the benefits of family planning. However, it had little
or no impact on husbands’ opposition and women’s fertility preferences. Based on these results, I allow the
program to permanently shift the disutility of using contraceptives in my structural model, but not fertility
preferences.
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Table 5.1: Impact of Different Family
Planning Programs
Model 1 Model 2
Radio 0.030
(0.019)
Television -0.014
(0.017)
Community 0.050∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.096)
Controls Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes
R2 0.0529 0.0529
Model fit
Data 2011 0.253 0.253
Model 2011 0.264 0.263
Data 2015 0.391 0.391
Model 2015 0.390 0.390
Counterfactual (community=4)
Model 2015 0.570 0.558
Number of observations 3391 3391
Standard errors are clustered at the cluster level (in parenthesis).
∗∗∗Significant at the 1% level.
∗∗Significant at the 5% level.
∗Significant at the 10% level.
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SECTION 6
STRUCTURAL ESTIMATION
6.1. Likelihood Function
Given a vector of parameters θ, the likelihood function for woman i conditional on her type µ is:
Li(θ|µ) =
∏
t
∏
j
(
pj(Ωit, θ, µ)Pj(Ωit, θ, µ)
ϕit(1− Pj(Ωit, θ, µ))(1−ϕit)
)dijt
× φ(ξit|Ωit, θ, µ)
where dijt is a dummy that is equal to one if individual i chooses j at time t and φ is the probability
density function of ξit ∼ N (0, σ2) . The likelihood of the observed data is a weighted average of the
type-specific likelihood functions, multiplied across individuals:
L(θ) =
∏
i
L∑
l=0
P (µ = l)Li(θ|µ = k)
θ is estimated by maximizing the likelihood function with a Quasi-Newton algorithm. At each iteration,
a line search is performed in a direction determined by the negative inverse Hessian times the gradient of
L, where the Hessian is approximated using the Broyden, Fletcher, Goldfar, and Shanno (BFGS) method.
Standard errors are computed by estimating the asymptotic covariance matrix of the maximum likelihood
estimator with the Outer Product of the Gradient (OPG) method.
6.2. Identification
The parameters of the utility function are identified by covariation in sexual activity, contraceptive use
and provider choices across the state space. For example, the birth spacing parameters α21 and α22 are
identified by observing women who are otherwise comparable choosing different combinations of choices,
depending on how recently they gave birth. The key parameters of interest are α2 through α10, which capture
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the effect of the supply environment and family planning programs in the utility function. There are two
potential sources of endogeneity that must be addressed in this regard.
First, access to quality might be correlated with the unobserved determinants of contraceptive use for
various reasons discussed in section 2.1. To illustrate this point, suppose there are two types of women. Type
one is less likely to use contraceptives due to some fixed unobservable characteristics. In addition, type one is
more present in underserved areas where provider quality is generally lower. In this case, there is a spurious
positive correlation between contraceptive use and access to quality. As discussed in the literature review, the
common approach of aggregating quality at the cluster level, controlling for a limited number of community
variables, would bias results.
In contrast, my model controls for permanent unobserved differences in the disutility of contraceptives
(such as personal opposition) and in fertility preferences (such as a stronger taste for children) with a discrete
number of unobserved types. Access to quality determines the unobserved type of a woman, which shifts her
fertility and contraceptive preferences in the utility function. This allows for a correlation between access to
quality and the unobserved determinants of fertility and contraceptive preferences.
The second issue is that exposure to family planning programs could be correlated with unobserved
determinants of fertility and contraceptive preferences. For example, community activities could be targeted
towards women who fear contraceptives, or women who have a stronger desire to control their fertility
could select into a greater number of programs. The model includes an exposure equation to control for
this type of endogenous relationship. Program exposure is a function of both observable characteristics and
unobserved types. Thus, the model allows for a correlation between program exposure, fertility preferences
and contraceptive preferences through the unobserved types.
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SECTION 7
RESULTS
7.1. Parameter Estimates
Table 9.1 (appendix) reports the estimates and standard errors of the parameters in the utility function.
The model is fit with three types. Type one women have a larger disutility of using contraceptives (-1.834)
than type zero (-1.356) and type two (-1.506) women. As expected, the parameters associated with price
(α6, α7) and distance (α8, α9) are negative and larger for poorer women, while the parameters associated
with provider quality (α5) and family planning programs (α10) are both positive. Note that α4 is equal to
-0.258 and α5 is equal to 0.738. Thus, between a health facility and an equally distant and priced pharmacy, a
woman will prefer the health facility if its quality index is greater than 0.258/0.738 = 0.3501. Parameters
α11 through α18 indicate that type one women have lower fertility preferences compared to type zero and
type two women and that education reduces fertility preferences (see figure 7.1). The cost of pregnancy
increases with age and if a woman gave birth recently. Finally, ρ is equal to 0.252, indicating that provider
choices are correlated, and the discount factor is fixed at 0.9.2
Table 9.3 (appendix) reports the estimates and standard errors of the parameters in the pregnancy equation.
The probability of pregnancy decreases with age, if a woman gave birth in the last period, and if she uses
birth control. In addition, type one and two women are less likely to become pregnant, conditional on being
sexually active.
Table 9.2 (appendix) provides the estimates of the exposure equation. Exposure increased significantly
in 2015 compared to 2013. Type one women were the most likely to be exposed to the community programs,
followed by type zero women. In addition, older women were slightly more likely to receive the intervention
(β5 is significant at the 10% level), but exposure did not vary significantly by education and wealth status.
1Just 5.0% of health facilities have a quality index below 0.350 at baseline
2The discount factor is often not estimated because it requires an exclusion restriction that affects the transition probabilities but
not the utility function to properly identify it (Arcidiacono, Sieg and Sloan 2007).
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Figure 7.1: Fertility Preferences by
Education (Type 1)
Table 7.1: Permanent Characteristics by Simulated
Type
Type 0 Type 1 Type 2
No education 44.8 38.8 42.3
Primary 36.8 42.3 35.7
Secondary 18.4 18.9 21.9
Husb. no education 50.2 48.4 45.7
Husb. primary 19.5 20.4 20.3
Husb. secondary 30.3 31.3 34.0
Poorest 39.3 40.4 34.0
Middle 36.4 35.1 32.8
Richest 24.3 24.5 33.2
Married before 18 26.9 28.0 25.5
Married between 18-23 55.5 53.7 48.7
Married after 23 17.5 18.3 25.8
Access 2.6 2.5 2.7
Sample percentage 20.9 6.6 72.6
All variables are expressed in percentage, except for Access.
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Table 9.4 (appendix) provides the parameter estimates of the type equation, with type zero parameters
normalized to zero. In addition, Table 7.1 shows the average characteristics of women by simulated type,
where types are drawn 200 times for each woman. Type zero, one and two represent 20.9%, 6.6% and 72.6%
of the sample respectively. Type zero and type one have similar permanent characteristics, except that type
zero is more likely to have no education and type one is more likely to have primary education. Type two,
which is unlikely to receive the intervention, tends to be more educated, have more educated husbands, be
more wealthy, get married latter and have slightly better access to quality than the two other types.
Table 7.2 is derived by drawing types 200 times for each women. I then simulate choices, pregnancies
and program exposure conditional on a woman’s observed state variables at baseline, midterm and endline. I
report the percentage of women that that make each choice and the percentage that become pregnant in the
pooled sample, by type. I also provide the average level of exposure at midterm and endline by type.
Table 7.2: Choices, Pregnancies and Exposure by
Simulated Type
Type 0 Type 1 Type 2
No sex 11.9 15.5 14.9
Unprotected sex 58.5 61.0 54.5
Protected sex 29.5 23.5 30.6
Pregnant 19.0 15.9 16.9
Midterm exposure 1.3 2.8 -0.1
Endline exposure 1.5 3.1 0.2
Sample percentage 20.9 6.6 72.6
All variables are expressed in percentage, except for Midterm
exposure and Endline exposure.
7.2. Model Fit
I assess the model fit by comparing the predictions of my model to the data. Baseline, midterm and
endline observations are pooled, and model predictions are obtained by simulating choices 200 times for each
woman, conditional on her observed state variables.
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Figure 7.2 shows the percentage of women who choose to be abstinent, have protected sex or unprotected
sex in the data (solid lines) and the simulated sample (dashed lines), averaged over two-year age bins.3
The model fits the data well. Contraceptive use is low at younger ages and increases over the life cycle.
This pattern is consistent with the parameter estimates, which imply that the cost of pregnancy increases
with age and the marginal utility of children decreases with parity. On the other hand, the probability of
pregnancy declines with age (figure 7.3), which explains the uptake of unprotected sex towards the end of the
reproductive life cycle.
Figure 7.2: Choices
3The sample of married women under 19 is too small to be displayed by age in figure 7.2 and 7.3, but is included in the other
model fit figures and tables.
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Figure 7.3: Pregnancies at Baseline
The percentage of pregnant women decreases over the life cycle and is lower among those who use
birth control (appendix figure 9.3). In addition, women are less likely to become pregnant if they gave birth
recently. This can be seen in table 9.5 in the appendix for women under the age of 30.4
Table 7.3 shows that women with primary or secondary education are more likely to use contraceptives
or be abstinent compared to women with no education. In addition, the model fits well the characteristics of
the providers chosen by women (table 7.4) and the level of program exposure at midterm and endline (table
7.5). Finally, exposure is correlated with greater contraceptive use at midterm and endline (table 7.6).
4I focus on women under the age of 30 since older women are more likely to done bearing children.
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Table 7.3: Choices by Education (%)
Data Model
No education
Abstinence 13.3 13.4
Unprotected sex 61.2 60.4
Protected sex 25.5 26.2
Primary
Abstinence 14.5 15.1
Unprotected sex 52.1 52.9
Protected sex 33.4 32.0
Secondary
Abstinence 16.5 15.0
Unprotected sex 51.1 51.0
Protected sex 32.5 34.0
Table 7.4: Provider Choices (%)
Data Model
Chosen quality 0.691 0.680
Chosen distance 0.983 0.997
Chosen price 1.664 1.682
Table 7.5: Program Exposure
Data Model
Midterm exposure 0.48 0.41
Endline exposure 0.68 0.68
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Table 7.6: Contraceptive Use by
Exposure at Midterm and Endline (%)
Data Model
Not exposed (ξt = 0) 32.1 29.0
Exposed (ξt > 0) 43.2 43.9
All 36.2 34.6
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SECTION 8
POLICY EXPERIMENTS
The estimated model allows me to simulate choices and pregnancies over the reproductive life of women,
under different types of scenarios. I start by decomposing the increase in contraceptive use that occurred
between 2011 and 2015 into three factors: women progressing through their life cycle (i.e. aging and having
children), changes to the supply environment, and exposure to family planning programs. I use the sample
of women who have both a baseline and an endline observation for this simulation exercise. The first line
of table 8.1 shows the percentage of contraceptive users in the matched sample in 2011. Next, I simulate
choices 200 times for each woman, conditional on her observed state variables in 2011. The model predicts
that 25.21% of women use contraceptives at baseline. I then fix the supply and exposure variables to their
baseline values and simulate choices and pregnancies from 2011 to 2015. In this simulation, the environment
is kept constant and women are aging, which isolates the effect of the first factor. The next simulation is
similar, except that I update all the provider variables to their endline values in 2013.1 Exposure variables are
kept to their baseline values (zero) in order to isolate the effect of the second factor. In the last simulation, I
update both the provider and exposure variables in 2013.
Table 8.1: Effect Decomposition (%)
Users
Baseline data 25.77
Baseline simulation 25.21
Fixed environment 25.54
Supply change 29.48
Supply change and exposure 35.56
Endline data 39.37
1The supply environment changes gradually between 2011 and 2015 in reality. I have limited provider data for the years between
2011 and 2015, so I update the provider variables halfway through this period, in 2013.
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The model underestimates contraceptive use at endline (35.37% versus 39.37% in the matched sample).
Nonetheless, the model suggests that 3.2% of the longitudinal increase in contraceptive use between 2011
and 2013 can be explained by aging, 38.1% by changes in the supply environment, and 58.7% by the ISSU
awareness campaign.
In the next set of simulations, I evaluate the maximum impact of the most common family planning
interventions: implementing an awareness campaign, reducing contraceptive prices, and increasing the
quantity and quality of providers. I apply the endline environment (supply and exposure) to the baseline
sample of women as a starting point to these simulations, in order to approximate as well as possible the
current state of Dakar, Mbour and Kaolack.2 I then simulate the choices and pregnancies of each woman 200
times, from her age in 2011 until the age of menopause (47). The initial state variables are taken from the
baseline data and are updated in each period as pregnancies occur.
Table 8.2: Maximum Impact
Current Completed
Users (%) Fertility
Reference 34.08 4.87
Price = 0 37.53 4.81
Quality = 1 37.97 4.80
Distance = 0 49.01 4.58
Exposure = 4 62.22 4.32
First, I keep the supply and exposure variables constant over time. Table 8.2 reports the predicted
percentage of contraceptive users in the first period, as well as the average number of children per women
at the end of this simulation. Next, I repeat this simulation under the following scenarios: contraceptives
are free, all providers have the maximum level of quality (index equals one), there is no distance to travel
to obtain contraceptives, and all women receive the four community programs. The goal is to evaluate the
upper-bound, the maximum impact possible with each type of policy.
Table 8.2 indicates that offering contraceptives for free and increasing the quality index to the maximum
for all providers would lead to a 10.1% and a 11.4% increase in contraceptive use, respectively. Note that
contraceptives prices are already low at endline (4900 CFA on average for pills and injectables, see table 4.7).
2The baseline sample is representative of married women in 2011. Differences with a current cross-section of married women
would be driven by long term demographic trends, such as younger cohorts getting married later or achieving more schooling.
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The quality index is also high for many providers and equal to 0.701 on average at endline. Thus, the latter
simulation should be interpreted as a 42.7% increase in the average quality of services.
The descriptive analysis in section 4.5 suggests that women are sensitive to travel costs, with the majority
traveling by foot to their providers. In the extreme scenario where travel costs are entirely eliminated (for
instance by delivering contraceptives through home visits), the percentage of contraceptive users increases by
43.8%. As a result, the average number of children per women would decline from 4.87 to 4.58. Exposing all
women to the four community activities (the average exposure was 0.684 at endline) would have the greatest
impact, increasing contraceptive use by 82.6% and reducing the average number of children per women to
4.32.
These simulations suggest that the price and quality of services are not the main factors that currently
limit contraceptive use in urban Senegal. Travel costs, which include the time and monetary cost of traveling
to a provider, and cultural barriers are greater obstacles. The latter includes personal or spousal opposition
and misconceptions about side effects, which can be addressed through family planning programs.
I design, based on these findings, a set of polices that would be more realistic to implement (table
8.3). The simulation method and the reference are similar to the previous table. The first policy is to offer
contraceptives for free in the public sector. The second is to ensure that all public health facilities have all five
methods and the basic medical material in stock, that all their reproductive health staff has received an ISSU
training, and that none impose restrictions based on age, parity or spousal consent.3 The third simulation is to
reduce the distance to each provider by 25%, which is equivalent to reducing the total cost of traveling by
25%. It could be achieved by expanding the public transportation system, which is currently limited in urban
Senegal. The fourth policy is to expand the awareness campaign so that all women are exposed to at least two
of the four community programs.
The last line in table 8.3 shows that combining all four policies would increase contraceptive use by
57.5% and reduce completed fertility from 4.87 to 4.49. Note that this represents the impact on all married
women between the age of 15 and 47 in the year that the policies are implemented. The average life-cycle
fertility does not decline much because the family size of older women is already determined. Table 9.6
shows that these policies would have a greater impact on younger women. For women under the age of 23,
3This policy would increase the endline quality index by 35.7% on average.
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Table 8.3: Policy Recommendations
Current Completed
Users (%) Fertility
Reference 34.08 4.87
Price = 0 in public sector 35.79 4.84
Improved quality in public sector 37.02 4.81
25% less travel cost 36.44 4.83
Exposure ≥ 2 45.61 4.66
All 53.67 4.49
combining all four policies would increase contraceptive use by 64.6% and reduce completed fertility from
5.12 to 4.38 children.4
4Women already have on average 1.0 children at the age of 23.
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SECTION 9
CONCLUSION
In this paper, I evaluate the impact of several large-scale family planning interventions on the fertility
decisions of married women in urban Senegal. Between 2011 and 2015, the Gates Foundation funded
a broad range of interventions in order to increase the number of contraceptive users in Dakar, Mbour
and Kaolack, three cities in Senegal. Supply-side interventions aimed at improving the quality of public
providers by reducing contraceptive stockouts and offering additional training in family planning. Demand-
side interventions employed radio programs, television programs, and community outreach to address the
benefits of family planning, acceptance by religious leaders, and misconceptions about the harmfulness of
contraceptives.
These interventions were not randomized, but they generated considerable variation in the supply and
demand for contraceptives, which can be captured with a structural model. I specify a dynamic discrete
choice model of fertility in which a married woman can decide, at each age, to be sexually active and whether
or not to use birth control. If she opts for birth control, she selects a contraceptive provider based on price,
quality and distance among all the providers that are located within a given distance of her dwelling place.
The quality of a provider affects the satisfaction she derives from a visit and how effectively she uses her
contraceptive method, and therefore the probability of pregnancy. In addition, a woman can be exposed to
four community programs (home visits, community conversations, neighborhood groups and religious talks)
that reduce her aversion towards contraceptives.
The model is estimated on a unique data set that includes all the contraceptive providers in Dakar, Mbour
and Kaolack, linked to a longitudinal sample of married women in each city. The estimated model is then
used to carry out several policy experiments. I start by decomposing into three different factors the increase
in contraceptive use that occurred between baseline (2011) and endline (2015) in the longitudinal sample.
During this four year period; (1) women progressed along their life cycle, aging and having children; (2)
the supply environment changed, with an overall increase in provider quality, a decline in contraceptive
prices, and an increase in the number of providers; (3) the demand-side interventions were implemented.
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Results shows that contraceptive use increased from 25.8% in 2011 to 39.4% in 2015, and that 3.2% of
this increase can be explained by aging, 38.1% by changes in the supply environment, and 58.7% by the
awareness campaign.
In the second set of simulations, I compare the impact of different policies on contraceptive use and
fertility after 2015. I find that further price reductions and quality improvements would minimally increase
the percentage of contraceptive users. On the other hand, reducing travel costs and cultural barriers could have
a substantial impact on contraceptive use. There remain widespread misconceptions about the harmfulness of
contraceptives in urban Senegal, which can be addressed by expanding the awareness campaign that was
implemented between 2011 and 2015 in Dakar, Mbour and Kaolack.
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APPENDIX
Figure 9.1: Senegal Population (in Millions)
Figure 9.2: Distribution of Prices
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Table 9.1: Utility Function Estimates
Parameter Variable Estimates SE
α1 st 1.845 0.217
α2 bt -1.356 0.212
α3,1 bt × I(µ = 1) -0.478 0.131
α3,2 bt × I(µ = 2) -0.150 0.091
α4 bt × hft -0.258 0.064
α5 bt × hft × qft 0.738 0.103
α6 bt × dft -0.443 0.053
α7,1 bt × dft × I(ω = 1) 0.049 0.015
α7,2 bt × dft × I(ω = 2) 0.084 0.018
α8 bt × pft -0.109 0.016
α9,1 bt × pft × I(ω = 1) 0.028 0.009
α9,2 bt × pft × I(ω = 2) 0.058 0.011
α10 bt × ξt 0.373 0.046
α11 nt 0.739 5.974
α12,1 nt × I(µ = 1) 0.044 0.137
α12,2 nt × I(µ = 2) -0.195 0.068
α13,1 nt × I(e = 1) 0.026 0.056
α13,2 nt × I(e = 2) -0.013 0.067
α14,1 nt × I(eh = 1) -0.006 0.061
α14,2 nt × I(eh = 2) 0.132 0.058
α15 n
2
t -0.014 0.008
α16,1 n
2
t × I(µ = 1) -0.024 0.016
α16,2 n
2
t × I(µ = 2) 0.006 0.008
α17,1 n
2
t × I(e = 1) -0.020 0.007
α17,2 n
2
t × I(e = 2) -0.029 0.009
α18,1 n
2
t × I(eh = 1) -0.002 0.007
α18,2 n
2
t × I(eh = 2) -0.018 0.007
α19 ϕt -0.619 54.98
α20 ϕt × t -0.138 0.059
α21 ϕt × ϕt−1 -2.489 0.778
α22 ϕt × (1− ϕt−1)× ϕt−2 -0.948 0.184
δ Discount factor 0.9 (fixed)
ρ Nest coefficient 0.252 0.031
σ Standard deviation 0.426 0.006
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Table 9.2: Exposure Equation Estimates
Parameter Variable Estimates SE
β0 Constant 1.210 0.044
β1,1 I(µ = 1) 1.564 0.023
β1,2 I(µ = 2) -1.334 0.014
β2 I(y = 2015) 0.282 0.026
β3,1 I(e = 1) 0.003 0.019
β3,2 I(e = 2) -0.018 0.024
β4,1 I(ω = 1) -0.021 0.020
β4,2 I(ω = 2) -0.037 0.022
β5 t 0.002 0.001
Table 9.3: Pregnancy Equation Estimates
Parameter Variable Estimates SE
γ0 Constant -2.216 0.749
γ1,1 I(µ = 1) -0.287 0.191
γ1,2 I(µ = 2) -0.042 0.102
γ2 t 0.196 0.051
γ3 t
2 -0.005 0.001
γ4 ϕt−1 -1.162 0.104
γ5 bt -2.319 0.120
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Table 9.4: Type Equation Estimates
Type 1 Type 2
Parameter Variable Estimates SE Estimates SE
τ0 Constant -1.110 0.223 1.033 0.134
τ1,1 I(e = 1) 0.306 0.175 -0.064 0.109
τ1,2 I(e = 2) 0.222 0.228 0.002 0.143
τ2,1 I(e
h = 1) 0.047 0.201 0.083 0.121
τ2,2 I(e
h = 2) 0.003 0.188 0.060 0.114
τ3,1 I(ω = 1) -0.105 0.178 -0.003 0.112
τ3,2 I(ω = 2) -0.062 0.206 0.379 0.127
τ4,1 I(a1 = 1) -0.111 0.183 -0.120 0.110
τ4,2 I(a2 = 1) -0.046 0.239 0.333 0.140
τ5 ξ -0.038 0.055 0.031 0.028
Figure 9.3: Pregnancies at Baseline by Method
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Table 9.5: Percentage of Women Under Age 30 Who
Are Pregnant by Time Since Last Pregnancy
Data Model
Last pregnancy:
One year ago 11.6 11.9
Two years ago 25.1 26.1
Over two years/never pregnant 33.1 30.3
Table 9.6: Maximum Impact
(Women Under Age 23)
Current Completed
Users (%) Fertility
Reference 28.45 5.12
Price = 0 31.67 5.00
Quality = 1 31.84 4.98
Distance = 0 42.26 4.56
Exposure = 4 55.01 4.04
54
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la De´mographie. 2014. Dakar, Senegal, Agence Nationale de
la Statistique et de la De´mographie, “Rapport De´finitif: Recensement Ge´ne´ral de la Population et de
l’Habitat, de l’Agriculture et de l’Elevage (RGPHAE 2013)”.
Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la De´mographie. 2016. Dakar, Senegal, Agence Nationale de
la Statistique et de la De´mographie, “Se´ne´gal: Enqueˆte De´mographique et de Sante´ Continue (EDS-
Continue 2015)”.
Akin, John S., and Jeffrey J. Rous. 1997. “Effect of Provider Characteristics on Choice of Contraceptive
Provider: a Two-Equation Full-Information Maximum-Likelihood Estimation.”Demography, 34(4): 513–
523.
Ali, Mohamed M. 2001. “Quality of Care and Contraceptive Pill Discontinuation in Rural Egypt.” Journal
of Biosocial Science, 33(2): 161–172.
Amador, Diego. 2015. “The Consequences of Abortion and Contraception Policies on Young Women’s
Reproductive Choices, Schooling and Labor Supply.” PhD diss. University of Pennsylvania.
Angeles, Gustavo, David K. Guilkey, and Thomas A. Mroz. 1998. “Purposive Program Placement and
the Estimation of Family Planning Program Effects in Tanzania.” Journal of the American Statistical
Association, 93(443): 884–899.
Angeles, Gustavo, David K. Guilkey, and Thomas A. Mroz. 2005. “The Determinants of Fertility in
Rural Peru: Program Effects in the Early Years of the National Family Planning Program.” Journal of
Population Economics, 18(2): 367–389.
Arcidiacono, Peter, Ahmed Khwaja, and Lijing Ouyang. 2012. “Habit Persistence and Teen Sex: Could
Increased Access to Contraception Have Unintended Consequences for Teen Pregnancies?” Journal of
Business and Economic Statistics, 30(2): 312–325.
Arcidiacono, Peter, Holger Sieg, and Frank Sloan. 2007. “Living Rationally under the Volcano? An
Empirical Analysis of Heavy Drinking and Smoking.” International Economic Review, 48(1): 37–65.
Arends-Kuenning, Mary, and Flora L. Kessy. 2007. “The Impact of Demand Factors, Quality of Care and
Access to Facilities on Contraceptive Use in Tanzania.” Journal of Biosocial Science, 39(1): 1–26.
Bjo¨rkman, Martina, and Jakob Svensson. 2009. “Power to the People: Evidence from a Randomized
Field Experiment on Community-Based Monitoring in Uganda.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
124(2): 735–769.
Bruce, Judith. 1990. “Fundamental Elements of the Quality of Care: A Simple Framework.” Studies in
Family Planning, 21(2): 61–91.
Cleland, John, Stan Bernstein, Alex Ezeh, Anibal Faundes, Anna Glasier, and Jolene Innis. 2006.
“Family planning: the unfinished agenda.” Lancet, 368(9549): 1810–1827.
Cronin, Christopher J., David K. Guilkey, and Ilene S. Speizer. 2016a. “The Effects of Health Facility
Access and Quality on Family Planning Decisions in Urban Senegal.” SSRN Working Paper 574073.
55
Cronin, Christopher J., David K. Guilkey, and Ilene S. Speizer. 2016b. “The Individual’s Choice of
Facility for Maternal Health and Family Planning Services in a Dense Urban Environment: The Case of
Senegal.” Working Paper.
Daff, Bocar Mamadou, Cheikh Seck, Hassan Belkhayat, and Perri Suttond. 2014. “Informed push
distribution of contraceptives in Senegal reduces stockouts and improves quality of family planning
services.” Global Health: Science and Practice, 2(2): 245–252.
Das, Jishnu, Alaka Holla, Veena Das, Manoj Mohanan, Diana Tabak, and Brian Chan. 2012. “In Urban
And Rural India, A Standardized Patient Study Showed Low Levels Of Provider Training And Huge
Quality Gaps.” Health Affairs, 31(12): 2774–2784.
Das, Jishnu, Jeffrey Hammer, and Kenneth Leonard. 2008. “The Quality of Medical Advice in Low-
Income Countries.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 22(2): 93–114.
de Walque, Damien, Paul J. Gertler, Sergio Bautista-Arredondo, Ada Kwan, Christel Vermeersch,
Jean de Dieu Bizimana, Agnes Binagwaho, and Jeanine Condo. 2015. “Using provider performance
incentives to increase HIV testing and counseling services in Rwanda.” Journal of Health Economics,
40: 1–9.
Donabedian, Avedis. 1988. “The Quality of Care: How Can It Be Assessed?” The Journal of the American
Medical Association, 260(12): 1743–1748.
Feyisetan, Bamikale J., and Martha Ainsworth. 1996. “Contraceptive Use and the Quality, Price, and
Availability of Family Planning in Nigeria.” The World Bank Economic Review, 10(1): 159–187.
Forsstrom, Matthew P. 2017. “Abortion Costs and Single Parenthood: A Life-Cycle Model of Fertility and
Partnership Behavior.” PhD diss. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
Gertler, Paul, and Christel Vermeersch. 2013. “Using Performance Incentives to Improve Medical Care
Productivity and Health Outcomes.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 19046.
Heckman, J., and B. Singer. 1984. “A Method For Minimizing The Impact Of Distributional Assumptions
In Econometric Models For Duration Data.” Econometrica, 52(2): 271–320.
Hong, Rathavuth, Livia Montana, and Vinod Mishra. 2006. “Family planning services quality as a
determinant of use of IUD in Egypt.” BMC Health Services Research, 6(1): 79–87.
Hotz, Joseph V., and Robert A. Miller. 1993. “Conditional Choice Probabilities and the Estimation of
Dynamic Models.” The Review of Economic Studies, 60(3): 497–529.
Keane, Michael P., and Kenneth I. Wolpin. 2007. “Exploring the Usefulness of a Nonrandom Holdout
Sample for Model Validation: Welfare Effects on Female Behavior.” International Economic Review,
48(4): 1351–1378.
Keane, Michael P., and Kenneth I. Wolpin. 2010. “The Role of Labor and Marriage Markets, Preference
Heterogeneity, and the Welfare System in the Life Cycle Decisions of Black, Hispanic, and White
Women.” International Economic Review, 51(3): 851–892.
Klemick, Heather, Kenneth L. Leonard, and Melkiory C. Masatu. 2009. “Defining Access to Health
Care: Evidence on the Importance of Quality and Distance in Rural Tanzania.” American Journal of
Agricultural Economics, 91(2): 347–358.
56
Leonard, Kenneth L., and Melkiory C. Masatu. 2007. “Variations In The Quality Of Care Accessible To
Rural Communities In Tanzania.” Health Affairs, 26(3): 380–392.
Magnani, Robert J., David R. Hotchkiss, Curtis S. Florence, and Leigh Anne Shafer. 1999. “The Impact
of the Family Planning Supply Environment on Contraceptive Intentions and Use in Morocco.” Studies
in Family Planning, 30(2): 120–132.
Mensch, Barbara, Mary Arends-Kuenning, and Anrudh Jain. 1996. “The Impact of the Quality of
Family Planning Services on Contraceptive Use in Peru.” Studies in Family Planning, 27(2): 59–75.
Shapira, Gil. 2013. “How Subjective Beliefs about HIV Infection Affect Life-Cycle Fertility.” World Bank
Working Paper 6343.
Shen, Junyi. 2009. “Latent Class Model Or Mixed Logit Model? A Comparison By Transport Mode Choice
Data.” Applied Economics, 41(22): 2915–2924.
Starbird, Ellen, Maureen Norton, and Rachel Marcus. 2016. “Investing in Family Planning: Key to
Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals.” Global Health: Science and Practice, 4(2): 191–210.
World Health Organization. 2005. Geneva, Switzerland, World Health Organization, “Report of a WHO
Technical Consultation on Birth Spacing”.
Yao, Jing, Alan T. Murray, and Victor Agadjanian. 2013. “A Geographical Perspective on Access to
Sexual and Reproductive Health Care for Women in Rural Africa.” Social Science and Medicine,
96: 60–68.
57
